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RESOLVING DOCTOR-PATIENT CONFLICTS 
Bernard L. .Diamond* 
TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-
PATIENT RELATIONS. By Robert A. Burt. New York: The Free 
Press. 1979. Pp. vii, 200. $15.95. 
Professor Burt of the Yale Law School has written a book that is 
concerned with a single problem, and he proposes a specific solution 
to that problem. This narrow theme makes the book very difficult to 
review fairly. If one agrees with the proposed solution, one may 
overvalue the book and not perceive whether the author reaches that 
solution through sound reasoning. If one disagrees with the author's 
conclusions, one may lose objectivity and overlook the broader im-
plications of the analysis that precedes the conclusion. 
I disagree with most of Professor Burt's analysis of the problem 
and I strongly disagree with his proposed solution. This disagree-
ment is despite my feelings of harmony with Professor Burt's interest 
and approach toward a difficult subject. Burt is a legal scholar who 
has a very considerable knowledge of psychoanalytic theory. I am a 
psychoanalyst who has some knowledge of legal theory, so we share 
much intellectual territory. Perhaps that is why we don't agree. Or 
is it because the medical mind and the legal mind can never agree, 
no matter how much they share? 
The_ problem posed by the author is a profound one: Who has, or 
should have, the power to make critical decisions in the doctor-pa-
tient relationship? Does the doctor know best? Perhaps doctors 
should make all final decisions. Does the patient's right of self-de-
termination override all other considerations? Perhaps we should 
never tolerate anything short of fully informed consent by the pa-
tient. Or should the law intervene in certain difficult situations, 
making a judge decide what is to be done? 
Burt introduces the problem by vividly describing two cases. The 
first is that of a young man who is horribly mutilated and blinded by 
an automobile fire and explosion. His treatment is slow, excruciat-
ingly painful and he will never be restored to a normal condition. 
The other case is that of an elderly woman who was confined in a 
mental hospital because of her tendency to wander about the streets. 
Her case is well known, for she is the subject of a leading. "least 
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restrictive alternative" appellate decision. 1 Burt uses these two cases 
to develop "the proposition that assigning exclusive choice-making 
authority in one party (whether patient, physician, or judge) and 
complementary choiceless status to another in an interpersonal 
transaction readily leads to paradoxically destructive results for all 
participants" (p. 134). For reasons I will develop below, I am im-
pelled to reply, "Not necessarily!" 
Relying almost entirely upon psychoanalytic theories concerning 
unconscious motives, attitudes and feelings, the author pursues his 
theme with vigor and consistency. He states: 
Whose claim of benevolence toward diseased people is to be be-
lieved? That is the underlying question of this work. My answer can 
be quickly summarized: no one's claim should be wholly believed or 
disbelieved, whether the claimant is physician or law reformer, judge 
or the diseased person himself. Rules governing doctor-patient rela-
tions must rest on the premise that anyone's wish to help a desperately 
pained, apparently helpless person is intertwined with a wish to hurt 
that person, to obliterate him from sight. It is not accidental that the 
injunction to "take care of'' someone has a two-edged meaning in pop-
ular speech [p. vi]. · 
To mitigate the dangers of unconscious ambivalence and destruc-
tive aggressive impulses, Burt proposes that all consent between doc-
tor and patient, for treatment of both physical and mental 
conditions, be reached only by what he calls "conversation" between 
them. By "conversation," he really seems to mean a psychothera-
peutic interchange, as prolonged as necessary, to resolve completely 
all unconscious ambivalence, in both the patient and the physician. 
If such conversation does not spontaneously resolve all ambivalence, 
Burt would allow no appeal to the law to make the decision, for the 
judge, who necessarily suffers from the same ambivalence, will inflict 
his own brand of unconscious aggression upon the patient and doc-
tor. 
The law cannot interrupt this dynamic by purporting to take con-
trol of relations between doctor and patient. It can only hope to ac-
complish this by refusing to take control, by forcing both doctors and 
patients to acknowledge that neither has unquestioned power over the 
other in order to prod both toward confronting the ultimate reality that 
neither has unquestioned power over the issues of disease, mortality, 
and dis-eased [sic] thinking that have brought them into relation. The 
law will only fuel rather than interrupt this destructive dynamic by 
providing a mechanism for advance review, for declaratory judgments, 
to decide all specific treatment issues in dispute between patients and 
physicians [p. 137]. 
Thus, Burt would use the authority of the court not to make a 
decision, but rather to force doctor and patient into "conversation." 
I. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
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Essential to Professor Burt's proposal is the element of uncertainty. 
The physician must know in advance the penalty for violating his 
patient's expressed wishes. Such penalty may be stringent or it may 
only be symbolic, but 
[t]he principle should remain clear that physicians are obliged to ob- . 
tain patients' consent in all matters; thus motivation will be established 
for conversation, for negotiation. But by keeping uncertain the precise 
consequences of any breach of this principle, the law establishes the 
motives for intense negotiation, for sustained face-to-face conversation 
in which each party feels himself personally engaged because each be-
lieves in the unavoidability of his own pain and the other's power to 
inflict pain on him [p. 140]. 
If the patient and doctor fail to resolve their conflict, the legal system 
should tread lightly. 
By promising that some subsequent judicial review of the doctor-pa-
tient conversation is available, but by withholding that review until the 
immediate participants have acted on their own disputed or agreed 
conclusions from that conversation, the law gives both participants a 
concrete demonstration that their conversation has an interminable, 
and comfortingly indestructable, dimension [p. 138]. 
Burt's judicial review will not produce a decision as to the correct 
action in giving or withholding the treatment. Rather, it will only 
review the adequacy of the conversation, assessing whether the con-
versation has ended properly or should be carried further. If the 
physician has acted improperly after an inadequate conversation 
with the patient, the court will impose a punishment that is appropri-
ate to the wrongdoing but that the physician could not have accu-
rately foretold. The goal is to avoid shifting the responsibility for 
decision upon the law, and instead to use the authority of the law to 
force upon the doctor and patient as extensive a negotiation conver-
sation (therapy?) as is necessary. 
The final chapter discusses the issues raised by what the author 
terms "silent patients." These are patients who, because of severe 
mental illness, incapacity, or unconsciousness, are unable to engage 
in the conversation required for informed consent. Here, two other 
cases are introduced and their dilemmas analyzed: Karen Quinlan 
and the less well-known Saikewicz. Saikewicz was a sixty-six year-
old man, severely mentally retarded, incapable of any meaningful 
verbal communication, who suffered from a fatal leukemia. People 
with such leukemia are normally given chemotherapy, which pro-
longs their lives but does not cure the disease. The treatment re-
quires cooperation from the patient, and it is often painful and 
distressing. Saikewicz's doctors petitioned a Massachusetts court to 
decide whether they should withhold chemotherapy because of his 
inability to consent, to cooperate, or to understand the reason for the 
suffering he might undergo as a result of the treatment. The court 
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authorized withholding chemotherapy, and Saikewicz soon died (p. 
145). 
For the complex problems aroused by such silent patients, the 
author prescribes the same conversational remedy, but in more com-
plex form. Neither physician, relative, friend, nor judge must speak 
for the patient. Especially, no one must presume to assert what the 
patient, if he could speak and understand, might desire. The solu-
tion must still be a conversation but of such extent that all who could 
possibly have any involvement or interest must participate. Because 
the physician and family are granted no advance legal immunity, 
[t]hese actors could withhold treatment and minimize these risks [of 
criminal prosecution] only by the most intense collaboration with one 
another, and with intense individualized attention to the uncommuni-
cative patient, in order to build a defensible record that every treat-
ment effort has been made and that the futility and painfulness of these 
efforts appeared so palpable to so many different people involved in 
the decision that all were prepared to take the risk of prosecution for 
criminal conspiracy rather than continue heartless compliance with the 
apparent letter of the law [p. 166]. 
Burt does not explain how to select the "many different people 
involved in the decision." In some situations, one might anticipate 
great difficulty in getting anyone involved. In other situations, all 
sorts of persons might claim involvement and decisional rights to 
which they are not entitled. One can foresee endless difficulties. 
Throughout the book, the author is annoyingly vague about how his 
proposed procedures should be implemented. 
Many of the inferences and psychoanalytic interpretations that 
Burt presents as established facts could be disputed: he gives no 
credit to alternative interpretations of psychological phenomena. 
His basic writing style expresses an unjustified attitude of certainty, 
conviction, and enthusiasm. If perceived as a highly speculative, 
somewhat one-sided, proposal for the solution of very difficult 
medico-legal problems based upon disputable psychoanalytic inter-
pretations of .unconscious motivation, Taking Care of Strangers is a 
fascinating and instructive book. But if considered as a practical and 
realistic proposal to cope with existing conflicts of medical informed 
consent, its usefulness is questionable. I fear the author had the lat-
ter rather than the former mission. 
Rather than go through the volume and nit-pick about all the 
points where I would prefer a different interpretation from Professor 
Burt's, I will limit myself to discussing a few of the broad and mis-
taken assumptions that, in my opinion, pervade the entire book. A 
relevant (apocryphal?) anecdote is told about Sigmund Freud. 
Freud was an inveterate cigar smoker, and one day a friend asked 
him, "Doctor Freud, how is it possible that you, who discovered that 
cigars and similar objects are actually phallic symbols, go around all 
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day with a penis in your mouth?" Freud replied, ''Yes, it is true that 
a cigar is a penis symbol. But do not forget that a good cigar is also a 
good cigar." 
By concentrating on the unconscious dynamics of the partici-
pants in the medical-legal-patient relationship and neglecting their 
conscious and intentional motivations, the author is misled into im-
practical and perhaps erroneous conclusions. Much of what he says 
concerning the unconscious destructive dynamics of doctor, patient, 
and judge may well be true. But it is not the whole story. The un-
conscious is an important determinant of human behavior, but it is 
not the sole determinant. Burt seems to give no credence to the pos-
sibility that experience, knowledge and insight might confer suffi-
cient power over one's destructive drives to permit rational actions 
and relationships, even without prolonged conversations. Professor 
Burt derives his hypotheses and his solutions from extraordinary and 
exceptional cases. They well fit what Judge David Bazelon of the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals calls "chamber of 
horrors cases." Laws and procedures based on such horror cases are 
not likely to be good. They are the hard cases that can make bad 
law. It may be that such cases evoke the malicious power of the 
unconscious. But the rules that govern the millions of everyday in-
teractions of doctors and patients must be responsive to the con-
scious egos, and give credibility to the will and intent of the 
participants. Burt seems to have overlooked the fact that ambivalent 
feelings do not necessarily give rise to ambivalent decisions and ac-
tions. To the contrary, I think that in most ordinary interpersonal 
situations, one side of the ambivalence is suppressed, for good or bad 
reasons, and the resultant action is unambivalent. Thus both patient 
and physician may suppress their mutual hostility and interact with 
trust and confidence. In the vast majority of simple, direct in-
terchanges between doctor and patient ( or between any two persons), 
it may be best, as Freud says, to pay attention to the cigars and leave 
the phallic symbols to the psychoanalytic couch. 
Thus, I believe, for most surgical and medical procedures, pa-
tients can give rational, informed consent in an atmosphere of trust, 
and the physician can suppress any sadistic motivations and respond 
to the patients' needs. However, I do agree with Burt that in special 
cases and special circumstances, this is not likely to be true. These 
include the chamber of horrors cases of pain, mutilation, and disa-
bility2 as well as the cases of uncooperative incompetent patients 
2. I am very familiar with the monstrous problems associated with such tragedies. During 
World War II, I had the major responsibility during one year of attempting to cope with the 
emotional problems of hundreds of blinded soldiers. In addition to their blindness, most of 
them had severe head injuries, and many had one or more mutilated arms or legs. See Dia-
mond & Ross, Emotional Adjustment of Newly Blinded Soldiers, 102 AM. J. OF PSYCH. 367 
(1945). 
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who are involuntarily confined and treated. For some such cases, 
Burt's extended and extensive conversations motivated by the threat 
of judicial review may work. But for many of these exceptional 
prob_lems it cannot be assumed that there is a rational, correct solu-
tion. Unfortunately, we cannot assume that every human problem 
has a proper answer. Sometimes every possible response to a prob-
lem will have significant detrimental consequences. Yet to take no 
action may be much more detrimental. Sometimes the knowledge 
required for a rational decision does not exist and will not magically 
appear, no matter how extensive and protracted the conversations 
between the participants. And in many cases an incorrect decision is 
better than no decision. 
These are the human problems where the issue is not, "Who 
knows the right answer?" Rather, it is, ''Who is accepted by society 
and the participants as having the authority to prescribe an answer?" 
Such authority may not necessarily be founded upon superior 
knowledge or special insights into the human condition. Nor is the 
responsibility inherent in that authority necessarily a quality- of the 
decision maker. It may well be simply attributed to him by social 
institutions or customs. Nevertheless, a sort of consensus cloaks the 
decision with an aura of wisdom and power, action is taken, and 
everyone can then go about their daily business. Certainly it is pos-
sible to demonstrate that the need for such authorities has its roots in 
the unconscious need for the omnipotent and omniscient father of 
infancy. But the decision is also a decision that needs to be made, 
roots or no roots. 
Different cultures at different times have used a variety of per-
sons to decide impossible problems. In our society, I believe, judges 
are admirably suited for this role. They are designated by society as 
authority figures; their decisions are translated into action. They are 
surrounded with sufficient mystique and symbols of wisdom and 
fairness that their decisions can be respected by all concerned. Be-
hind them is the Law, supposedly the distillation of the moral wis-
dom of the ages. That all this may be illusory is beside the point. 
Some ill~sions are worth retaining. When there is no right answer, 
when there is no existing wisdom to determine the correct response, 
when the truth is elusive, yet action must be taken, judges seem to do 
quite well (unless they suffer from excessive scrupulousness or blind 
arrogance). When there has been a breakdown in the normal com-
munication between doctor and patient, or when, as with "silent pa-
tients," communication is impossible, Professor Burt would have us 
avoid the one decision maker in our society peculiarly suited to the 
task - the judge. Rather than limit his authority, I would extend it. 
I would reinforce his decisional respectability by establishing, inso-
far as possible, guidelines Oaws?) and precedents that take some of 
the burden off his shoulders. 
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I know only too well from my experience as a forensic psychia-
trist that judges are not always wise, rational, free from prejudice, or 
responsible in their decisions. Sometimes I have thought that others 
would have made better decisions, or that I, personally, could have 
done better. But neither I nor the others possessed the necessary au-
thority and social ascription of power and respectability to have our 
decisions accepted. Some judges never make any decisions, let alone 
difficult or impossible decisions. They pass the problem on to some-
one else, or they procrastinate, or they rubber-stamp, or they blindly 
follow what they believe to be precedent. They may do exactly as 
Burt says - wreak havoc by inflicting their own unconscious aggres-
sion on others. But I have more faith than Professor Burt that the 
law and its representatives, the judges, are the proper instruments for 
resolving conflict and dispute and for making decisions in all those 
human situations where no one else has the proper combination of 
knowledge, experience, wisdom, power, authority, and respectability 
to do as well. 
